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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Clean Air Act was passed in 1977, the United States’ 
purpose regarding our nation’s air has been to keep it healthy and 
safe, as well as to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the 
productive capacity of its population . . . [and] to achieve the 
prevention and control of air pollution.”1 Under the Trump 
administration, there was a significant trend towards deregulation 
of environmental and climate initiatives and programs, and 
specifically applicable to this case note, the Kigali Amendment to the 
Montreal Protocol. However, while the federal government failed to 
take the initiative to reduce emissions in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement, various states started to rise to the challenge and act as 
a cohesive unit under the United States Climate Alliance.2 
This case note aims to tackle the question of whether states have 
the power to regulate greenhouse gases, specifically 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) within vehicle air conditioning units in 
light of precedent case law, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
guidance documents, and the newly minted EPA revocation of 
California’s Clean Air Act tail-pipe emissions waiver. In Part II, I will 
provide a brief background of HFCs, their environmental impacts, 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1)–(2). 







and their regulation under the Clean Air Act. Next, I will briefly 
recount how HFCs have been regulated to date, focusing on the 
procedural history involving HFCs under the Montreal Protocol, the 
Significant New Alternatives Program (SNAP), the Kigali 
Amendment, and the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Mexichem v. EPA.3 Part 
III includes a brief case study of California and Washington—two 
states that successfully regulated HFCs at the state level—and 
comments on the U.S. Climate Alliance. Then, Part IV provides an 
in-depth analysis of the effect of the revocation of California’s Clean 
Air Act emissions waiver in the context of HFCs in vehicle air 
conditioning units. Within this analysis, I discuss dormant 
commerce clause and preemption issues to determine the efficacy of 
states’ future HFC regulations within vehicle air conditioning 
systems. Finally, Part IV concludes that state regulation of HFCs is 
likely impermissible under preemption doctrines as well as dormant 
commerce clause analyses. State legislation would likely conflict 
with preemption clauses under the Clean Air Act due to the indirect 
effect that air conditioning has on fuel efficiency as well as its direct 
conflict with labeling requirements. Similarly, state regulation of 
HFCs in vehicular air conditioning systems would likely violate the 
dormant commerce clause due to the impermissible 
extraterritoriality reach that the effect of labeling and retrofitting 
requirements would have on out-of-state interests and interstate 
commerce. 
II. WHAT ARE HYDROFLUOROCARBONS? 
BACKGROUND, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
A. Development, Structure and Background of 
Hydrofluorocarbons 
HFCs are extremely potent greenhouse gases (GHGs), often 
identified as Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (SLCPs) due to their 
global warming potential (GWP) 1000 to 3000 times as strong as that 
of carbon dioxide.4 Short-lived climate pollutants are chemicals that 
 
3. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 






remain in the atmosphere for a shorter period of time compared to 
other pollutants such as carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide. Some 
examples of SLCPs include HFCs, methane, black carbon aerosols, 
and tropospheric ozone, which can last in the atmosphere anywhere 
from several days (black carbon) to approximately 15 years (HFCs).5 
However, when compared to the timespan of carbon dioxide and 
nitrous oxide, which can subsist within the environment for 
“centuries to millennia,”6 these SLCPs or “super greenhouse gases,” 
while short-lived, are approximately 1,000 times more effective at 
trapping heat than carbon dioxide.7 SLCPs like the ones mentioned 
above have been identified to only represent approximately 1% of 
global emissions; however, observations and studies have shown that 
these SLCPs, and HFCs specifically, have increased within the 
atmosphere at a rate of 10–15% per year8 and will likely continue to 
rise, especially in developing countries.9 While HFCs are utilized in 
many different industrial and commercial fashions and end-uses,10 
they are exclusively studied here within the umbrella of refrigerants, 
specifically HFCs used within vehicle air conditioners.11 HFCs are 
useful in these particular types of end-uses because they have high 
volatility, low thermal conductivity, low surface tension, and low 
flammability.12 However, while many GHGs occur naturally, such as 
carbon dioxide and methane, HFCs are completely anthropogenic 
 
5. Y. Xu et al., The Role of HFCs in Mitigating 21st Century Climate Change, 13 
ATMOSPHERIC CHEM. & PHYSICS 6083, 6083 (2013). 
6. Id. 
7. Kigali Meeting Agrees to Worldwide Phaseout of “Super Warming” HFCs, 46 
ENV. L. REP. INT’L UPDATE, no. 30, Oct. 24, 2016, 
https://elr.info/international/international-update/archive/46/30 
[https://perma.cc/F9XM-W7GD]; DURWOOD ZAELKE ET AL., PRIMER ON HCFS 4 (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.igsd.org/documents/HFCPrimer29Nov2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL5P-
WGET]; Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), CLIMATE & CLEAN AIR COAL., 
https://ccacoalition.org/en/slcps/hydrofluorocarbons-hfc [https://perma.cc/2X7D-JUS8]. 
8. Guus J. M. Velders et al., Preserving Montreal Protocol Climate Benefits by 
Limiting HFCs, 335 SCI. 922, 922 (2012); Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), CLIMATE & 
CLEAN AIR COAL., https://ccacoalition.org/en/slcps/hydrofluorocarbons-hfc 
[https://perma.cc/2X7D-JUS8].  
9. See Xu et al., supra note 5, at 6086–87. 
10. Wen-Tien Tsai, An Overview of Environmental Hazards and Exposure Risk 
of Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 61 CHEMOSPHERE 1539, 1541–42 (2005). 
11. See discussion infra Part III.  




and have only started being widely used throughout the last thirty 
years.13  
B. International Efforts to Regulate and Phase-Down 
Hydrofluorocarbons 
HFCs have only been in existence since the 1990s, due almost 
exclusively to the Montreal Protocol and the subsequent regulated 
phase-down of Ozone-Depleting Substances (ODSs), specifically 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
(HCFCs).14 These chemicals were utilized in the above-described 
industrial contexts; however, they were phased out and replaced 
with chlorine-free, man-made HFCs. While these replacement 
chemicals do not contain the ozone-depleting properties or chemical 
constituents of their predecessors (mainly chlorine), they do contain 
chemicals that are extremely effective at trapping solar radiation—
specifically infrared—and absorbing heat within the lower 
atmosphere, thus contributing to the overall global warming 
potential.15 As such, various scientific models have estimated that, if 
nothing changes and the developed world continues its “business-as-
usual” use, certain estimates indicate HFCs could contribute to an 
approximately 27–45% increase of radiative forcing of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) by 2050.16 While this may seem like an insubstantial increase, 
these percentages are quite significant considering the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in their Special Report on Global 
Warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius, includes the reduction of SLCPs in 
most mitigation pathways to effectuate warming to only 1.5 
degrees.17 Thus, it is evident that HFC emissions constitute a 
material contribution to climate change and its associated 
 
13. See id. at 1541–42 (highlighting the start of industrial and commercial uses 
of HFCs in early 1990). 
14. See id. at 1540.  
15. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), MINN. 
POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, https://www.pca.state.mn.us/air/chlorofluorocarbons-
cfcs-and-hydrofluorocarbons-hfcs [https://perma.cc/S2NB-RF59]. 
16. Xu et al., supra note 5, at 6084; see Velders et al., supra note 8, at 922. 
17.	Joeri Rogelj et al., Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5oC in the Context 
of Sustainable Development, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC 93, 118 (Valérie Masson-
Delmotte et al. eds., 2018), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Re




environmental and health hazards.18 Some of these effects include a 
significant drop in air quality, the increase of heat-related deaths due 
to increase in extreme heat events, and the increase in frequency of 
extreme weather events, which can damage critical infrastructure, 
result in widespread death, and cause severe shortages of necessary 
resources such as food, water, and shelter19 
The phase-down of HFCs is clearly a global issue; however, the 
only way in which a true freeze and phase-down of HFCs will occur 
is if the developed countries act first and quickly. Doing so will give 
developing countries a buffer to begin their freeze and phase-down.20 
This method was developed through the Montreal Protocol, in which 
developed countries successfully phased-out the use of CFCs by 1996, 
and developing countries followed suit by 2010,21 which lends 
support to the attestation that the Montreal Protocol was (and still 
is) the most successful global climate initiative to-date.22 However, 
in order for HFCs to be as effectively regulated and removed from 
use as CFCs under the Montreal Protocol, each country must take 
the initiative to actively pursue this goal, as enumerated within the 
Kyoto Protocol.23 
The Kyoto Protocol was an agreement between certain countries 
to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, including HFCs, 
by at least 5% below 1990 levels between 2008-2012, and the United 
States is one of the countries included within the initial list of 
countries.24 However, when it came time for the Protocol to be 
ratified, the United States declared that it would not be involved.25  
 
18. See id. at 118, 141. 
19.	 See Climate Impacts on Human Health, EPA, 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-impacts/climate-impacts-human-
health_.html [https://perma.cc/WN3L-LK97] (Jan. 13, 2017); see Ove Hoegh-
Guldberg et al., Impacts of 1.5oC of Global Warming on Natural and Human 
Systems, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC, supra note 17, at 183–252. 
20. See Heleen de Coninck, Strengthening and Implementing the Global 
Response, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC, supra note 17, at 353. 
21. Xu et al., supra note 5, at 6084. 
22. Velders, et al., supra note 8, at 922. 
23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].   
24. Id. 
25.	See Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate 






Since then, the United States has been involved with various 
pieces of international emissions reductions agreements, especially 
under the Obama administration, starting with the Paris 
Agreement. The Paris Agreement’s purpose was to strengthen the 
global response to climate change and demonstrates a consolidated 
effort to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, 
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and 
impacts of climate change.”26 While the Paris Agreement is an 
incredibly important tool to address the global problem of 
anthropogenic emissions and climate change, it does not specifically 
address HFCs, and thus, will not be analyzed in detail. Still, the 
connection between the Paris Agreement and HFCs is strong, as 
demonstrated by President Obama’s statement recognizing how 
simply focusing on these voluntary emissions reductions will not be 
enough and that aggressive, mandatory enforcement of curbing 
HFCs is necessary.27 As such, in the later stages of the Obama 
Administration, and subsequent to the Paris Agreement, the United 
States engaged in discussions regarding the Kigali Amendment to 
the Montreal Protocol.  
This particular amendment represents an aggressive 
international agreement to phase-down the use of HFCs and include 
them in the Montreal Protocol since they are incredibly potent 
greenhouse gases (yet not ozone depleting substances).28 However, 
 
26. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of 
the Paris Agreement art. 2, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) 
[hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
27. See Coral Davenport, Nations, Fighting Powerful Refrigerant That Warms 
Planet, Reach Landmark Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/world/africa/kigali-deal-hfc-air-
conditioners.html [https://perma.cc/FB6S-4XKS]; Remarks Announcing the United 
States Formal Entry into the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Paris Agreement in Hangzhou, China, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 556 (Sep. 3, 
2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201600556/pdf/DCPD-
201600556.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB7D-HSYN]. Even back in 2013, President Obama 
and President Xi of China formally agreed to set phase-down of HFCs as an 
emissions priority, and in President Obama’s address surrounding the Paris 
Agreement, he reiterated that “the Paris Agreement alone won’t solve the climate 
crisis. But it does establish an enduring framework that enables countries to ratchet 
down their carbon emissions over time.” Id. 
28. UNEP, THE KIGALI AMENDMENT TO THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL: HFC PHASE-
DOWN (2016), https://multimedia.3m.com/mws/media/1365924O/unep-fact-sheet-




while the United States was represented at the 28th Meeting of the 
Parties to the Montreal Protocol in Kigali, Rwanda on October 15, 
2016, the Trump administration refused to ratify the amendment.29 
C. Significant New Alternatives Program and the Clean 
Air Act 
While there is no current movement to address HFCs in the 
United States under the Kigali Amendment, prior to 2016, EPA, 
under the Obama administration, had begun to develop and 
implement a national regulation to phase-down hydrofluorocarbons 
under authority delegated through the Clean Air Act and the 
Montreal Protocol, identified as the Significant New Alternatives 
Policy Program (SNAP).30 This program garnered its authority from 
the Clean Air Act and the Montreal Protocol, specifically Section 612 
of the Clean Air Act, which authorized the Administrator to replace 
Class I and Class II substances (various CFCs and HCFCs, 
respectively) with substances that reduce overall risks to human 
health and the environment.31 Furthermore, this Section also 
authorizes the Administrator to publish lists of safe alternatives, and 
a list of substitutes that are prohibited,32 which may be determined 
based off of “new information” or “changed circumstance”33 that 
“may present adverse effects to human health or the environment.”34 
Therefore, EPA began to phase out the use of HFCs through the 
administrative rulemaking process.  
One of the most highly-utilized HFCs within the vehicle air 
conditioning industry is HFC-134a, which is included within the 
SNAP substitutes list as “unacceptable” for vehicles with “Model 
 
29. Editorial Board, This Treaty Is Good for the Environment. It Might Even Be 
Good for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/opinion/trump-kigali-agreement.html 
[https://perma.cc/S8ZN-XD8Q]. 
30. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain 
Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 
42,870, 42,870 (July 20, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82); see also 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 82.170–82.184 (2020).  
31. Clean Air Act § 612, 42 U.S.C. § 7671(k).  
32. Id. 
33. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain 
Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg. at 
42,876.  




Year (MY) 2021, except [where] allowed under a narrowed use limit 
. . . through MY 2025.”35 This particular man-made refrigerant is one 
of the most frequently used HFCs36 and has a high GWP of 
approximately 1300, over a 100-year span, and contributes the 
highest level of “radiative forcing.”37 Radiative forcing (RF), as 
defined by the IPCC, is the “change in net downward radiative flux 
at the tropopause after allowing for stratospheric temperatures to 
readjust to radiative equilibrium, while holding surface and 
tropospheric temperatures and state variables . . . fixed at the 
unperturbed values,” indicating that a high RF correlates to a 
stronger effect on the atmosphere and, thus, a higher detriment to 
climate change.38 Additionally, this chemical is manufactured and 
distributed by Koura, once Mexichem Fluor, Inc.,39 a company that 
specializes in fluorocarbon sales. This company brought suit against 
the EPA on behalf of various refrigerant industry companies as a 
result of the inability to manufacture and distribute HFC-134a 
(among others) due to the SNAP regulations and rollbacks of these 
particular refrigerants. 
D. Discussion and Analysis of Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. 
EPA in the context of Federal/State Regulation 
Mexichem Fluor, Inc. and Arkema, two industry-leaders of 
fluorocarbon manufacturing and distribution both internationally 
and within the United States, brought suit against the EPA in the 
 
35. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain 
Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg. at 
42,872; 40 CFR pt. 82, subpt G, app. B. 
36. What are Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)?, GLOB. MONITORING LAB’Y, 
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/about/hfc.html [https://perma.cc/G5PF-NEW5].  
37. GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, GLOBAL WARMING POTENTIAL VALUES, 
https://www.ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/ghgp/Global-Warming-Potential-
Values%20%28Feb%2016%202016%29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZT2-52NC].  
38. Gunnar Myhre et al., Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 659, 665 (Thomas F. Stocker et 
al. eds., 2013), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_Chapter08_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/982N-L9ZY].  
39. Klea ® 134a (R-134a), KUORA, https://www.klea.com/air-conditioning/r134a/ 
[https://perma.cc/DNK5-DPAU]; Mexichem Fluor Changes Name to Koura, COOLING 
POST (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.coolingpost.com/world-news/mexichem-fluor-
changes-name-to-koura/ [https://perma.cc/QZ7Z-8QX2]. This company changed its 
name to Koura in accordance with the parent company of Mexichem changing its 




D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the 2015 SNAP rule that 
effectively forced these companies to discontinue production of 
HFCs, especially HFC-134a.40 Judge Kavanaugh (now Supreme 
Court Justice Kavanaugh) presided over this case and ultimately 
found that the EPA had overextended its authority. The Court held 
that the Clean Air Act did not give the agency the authority to add 
previously-deemed safe alternatives to the list of prohibited 
substitutes.41 In finding this, the Court reiterated that “EPA may 
only act as authorized by Congress. Here, EPA has tried to jam a 
square peg (regulating non-ozone depleting substances that may 
contribute to climate change) into a round hole (the existing 
statutory landscape).”42 As such, the Court held that, since this 
particular section of the Clean Air Act (Section 612, enacted as a 
result of the Montreal Protocol) only deals with “ozone-depleting 
substances” and not greenhouse gasses, there is no statutory 
authority for the EPA to act on a quasi-legislative function.43  
Furthermore, the Court also disposed of EPA’s argument that 
the language of the statute, specifically the word “replace,” indicates 
that every time a manufacturer uses a substitute instead of CFCs, 
they are “replacing” it over and over again.44 Here, the Court looked 
to the plain meaning of “replace” in order to effectively dispose of this 
argument and, in analyzing EPA’s interpretation under Chevron, 
determined that “EPA’s strained reading of the term . . . contravenes 
the statute and thus fails at Chevron step 1.”45 While this holding 
effectively vacates the 2015 SNAP Rule, in that manufacturers are 
not required to replace HFCs with a substitute chemical, the court 
did specify that its holding does not apply to manufacturers who are 
still currently manufacturing or utilizing CFCs.46 In that instance, 
they are restricted from substituting CFCs with HFCs and must use 
a substitute within the updated and approved list of substitutes.47 
In the wake of the Mexichem v. EPA decision, the SNAP 2015 
Rule was effectively vacated. As a result of this vacatur, EPA 
developed a guidance document to advise industry and interested 
 
40. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
41. Id. at 460–61.  
42. Id. at 460.  
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 458–59. 
45. Id. 
46. See id. at 457, 459–60, 462. 




parties on the outcome of this case and to clarify the uncertainty 
regarding the regulated field in the aftermath.48 In doing so, EPA 
provided clarification regarding the court’s differentiation between 
“product manufacturers” and “other users,” specifying that since the 
2015 Rule does not specify or distinguish between “manufacturer,” 
generally, that the court’s vacatur will apply to “any regulated 
parties” in order to dispel confusion between specific case-by-case 
scenarios in the interim.49 Additionally, the EPA provides examples 
of potential future steps that the agency may take to address the 
court’s vacatur, including potential regulations and the phase down 
of HFCs in general.50 EPA discusses the premise of rolling out a 
notice and comment period within the proposed rulemaking and 
noted a few specific issues that may be addressed, which include 
specific definitions within the Code of Federal Regulations of 
“substitute” and “use,” whether the EPA should actually distinguish 
between product manufacturers and general users regulated by the 
rule (as the court specified), whether the regulation applies to a 
specific facility’s use of a particular chemical or if the chemical in and 
of itself is restricted, and whether HFCs can be regulated under 
other types of legislation within the United States, such as the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), or through other Clean Air Act 
programs, such as under National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) or the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 
program.51  
As of the date of the publication of this Note, EPA has not 
addressed the remand with a notice and comment rulemaking, and 
an additional docket has not been established in order to do so.52 As 
a result of this vacatur as well as the fact that EPA has been 
stagnant on the notice-and-comment rulemaking and the Trump 
administration did not ratify the Kigali amendment, various states 
 
48. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Notification of Guidance and a 
Stakeholder Meeting Concerning the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) 
Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,431, 18,432 (Apr. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
42).  
49. Id. at 18,433–34 (specifies that since the court vacated and remanded back 
to the EPA in order to promulgate a refined rule in accordance with the holding, that 
the guidance is only applicable as a short-term clarification, until a proper notice and 
comment period is conducted). 
50. Id. at 18,435–36. 
51. Id.  
52. See SNAP Regulations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/snap/snap-regulations 




have started to take matters into their own hands and regulate 
HFCs at a local-level. 
III. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE U.S. CLIMATE 
ALLIANCE AND STATE-LEVEL REGULATION OF 
HFCS 
A. The U.S. Climate Alliance—Brief Introduction and 
Analysis 
The U.S. Climate Alliance is a group of approximately 24 states 
within the United States that are like-minded in the sense that they 
all are individually striving to achieve emissions reductions 
consistent with the Paris Agreement.53 U.S. Climate Alliance states, 
including New York and California—two states historically on the 
forefront of energy and climate initiatives—have joined together to 
attempt to create cohesiveness throughout the U.S. in regulation and 
phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons.54 Furthermore, between 2005 
and 2016, U.S. Climate Alliance states have enjoyed economic 
benefits and experienced an average of 14% reduction in emissions, 
compared to the national average of 11%.55  
In regulating HFCs, the U.S. Climate Alliance has issued a 
guidance document titled, “From SLCP Challenge to Action,” which 
effectively lays the groundwork for U.S. Climate Alliance states to 
implement short-lived climate pollutant (including HFCs) 
legislation, regulations, and guidance documents in order to continue 
with the overarching goal of reducing current SLCP levels by 40–
50% by 2030.56 The framework lays out many ways in which to 
implement HFC regulation at the state-level, which includes 
adopting the SNAP regulations, providing incentives to the phase-
down of HFCs, and supporting the ratification of the Kigali 
 
53. U.S. CLIMATE ALL., supra note 2. 
54. See id. 
55. Id. 
56. U.S. CLIMATE ALL., FROM SLCP CHALLENGE TO ACTION: A ROADMAP FOR 
REDUCING SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS TO MEET THE GOALS OF THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 2 (Sept. 2018), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a4cfbfe18b27d4da21c9361/t/5b9a9cc1758d4
66394325454/1536859334343/USCA+SLCP+Roadmap_final+Sept2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NV8C-5H9X] [hereinafter SLCP Challenge]. The 40–50% goal will 




Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.57 However, while the 
guidance document states that some of these options can be 
completed because the Clean Air Act explicitly allows states to “set 
more stringent regulations than the federal government,”58 this may 
be in question after the revocation of California’s Clean Air Act 
waiver under the Trump Administration, as it is unclear whether 
federal law preempts or otherwise constrains state authority to 
regulate HFCs in this manner.59 While this revocation must be taken 
into consideration, multiple U.S. Climate Alliance states have 
already implemented, or intend to implement, versions of their own 
state-level regulations of HFCs.60  
B. State-Regulation of Hydrofluorocarbons—California 
California’s legislature passed Senate Bill 1013, which 
effectively added Section 39734 to the California Health and Safety 
Code as well as Division 45 to the Public Resources Code, which 
relates to Greenhouse Gases.61 This bill was signed into law on 
September 13, 2018, and in doing so, California prohibited 
fluorinated chemicals while establishing a Fluorinated Gases 
Emissions Reduction Program, which aims to “promote the adoption 
of new refrigerant technologies to achieve short- and long-term 
climate benefits, energy efficiency, and other cobenefits, as 
specified,” while including the implementation of an incentive 
program,62 which is also suggested in the U.S. Climate Alliance 
Framework document.63 Additionally, this particular piece of 
legislation focuses on the restriction of HFCs specifically used in 
refrigeration and foam end-uses; however, it does not specify 
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Authority, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1200644 
[https://perma.cc/J97H-K4JM]. See also discussion infra Part IV.  
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whether the refrigeration encompasses air conditioning within units 
and/or within vehicles.64  
As such, this will be analyzed in the context of California’s newly 
revoked emissions waiver under the Clean Air Act, and whether 
vehicular refrigerants within mobile air conditioners can be 
regulated at the state-level, taking into consideration preemption 
and dormant commerce clause issues. Part IV will address this in 
further detail, and provide the analysis dictated above, while Part V 
will discuss the next steps that state-governments can take with 
California’s Clean Air Act emissions waiver revoked.  
C. State-Regulation of Hydrofluorocarbons—Washington  
Washington’s bill, on the other hand, is identified as Engrossed 
Second Substitute House Bill 1112.65 This bill was proposed by 
Washington’s House of Representatives on March 1, 2019, passed by 
the state’s Senate on April 22, 2019, and finally became effective on 
July 28, 2019.66 Similar to California’s bill, Washington took the 
initiative to address HFCs at the state level instead of waiting for 
Congress to clarify the scope of EPA’s authority to regulate HFCs. 
Therefore, the main thrust of Washington’s HFC bill focuses on the 
“transition to the use of less damaging hydrofluorocarbons or 
suitable substitutes . . . in a manner similar to the regulations that 
were adopted by the environmental protection agency.”67 The 
regulations referred to within Washington’s bill are the SNAP 
regulations and program that were effectively vacated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court case of Mexichem Fluor, Inc., v. EPA.68  
Similar to California’s legislation, Washington focuses on end-
uses that do not include new light duty vehicles, including 
propellants, polyurethane applications and spray foams, 
supermarket systems, residential consumer refrigeration products, 
and centrifugal chillers, among other examples.69 However, unlike 
California, Washington does include within its regulations a 
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provision that explicitly refers to “new light duty vehicles,” and 
reads, “[w]ithin twelve months of another state’s enactment or 
adoption of restrictions on substitutes applicable to new light duty 
vehicles, the department may adopt restrictions applicable to the 
sale, lease, rental, or other introduction into commerce by a 
manufacturer of new light duty vehicles consistent with the 
restrictions identified in appendix B, Subpart G of [the SNAP 
regulations].”70 In theory, while this is particularly exciting because 
it allows Washington to adopt the regulatory scheme of SNAP 
through another state’s legislation, it is also concerning, at this point 
in time, due to the revocation of California’s emission waivers.  
Prior to the emission revocation, the more important legal issue 
to understand and analyze regarding the efficacy of regulation of 
HFCs in vehicle air conditioners was the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, due to the inherent nature of motor vehicles being able to 
cross state lines. Now, states have to contend with preemption issues 
since EPA has explicitly reserved GHG vehicle emissions to 
themselves, removing the carve-out of more stringent standards that 
California has capitalized on for decades.71  
EPA’s waiver revocation aside, another interesting facet of the 
bill is the requirement of manufacturers to “disclose the substitutes 
used in its products or equipment.”72 Furthermore, the bill continues 
to explain what particular form the disclosure must take, specifying 
that the disclosure must be, “[a] label on the equipment or product. 
The label must meet requirements designated by the department by 
rule. To the extent feasible, the department must recognize existing 
labeling that provides sufficient disclosure of the use of substitutes 
in the product or equipment.”73 This language is also significant from 
a legal analysis standpoint because, not taking into consideration the 
added dimension that the California emissions waiver revocation 
instills, labeling in and of itself can invoke both preemption and 
dormant commerce clause analyses as well as extraterritoriality 
issues. That is, the legislation may have “the ‘practical effect’ of 
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regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders” 
and thus be in violation of the Commerce Clause.74  
Lastly, the Washington bill includes guidelines for monetary 
reparations when violations occur.75 Again, as explained above in the 
analysis of California’s HFC legislation, other states in conjunction 
with the U.S. Climate Alliance have also made impressive strides to 
utilize state power in regulating HFCs. However, as of the date of 
this Note, there are no states within the U.S. Climate Alliance that 
have included the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from 
vehicles, light duty or otherwise, in their legislation.76 As such, 
regulation of HFCs within vehicles will be analyzed in detail in the 
next section, followed by a discussion of California’s emissions waiver 
and subsequent revocation. 
IV. EPA REVOCATION OF CALIFORNIA’S CLEAN 
AIR ACT EMISSIONS WAIVER AND ITS EFFECT 
ON STATE-LEVEL HFC REGULATION IN 
VEHICLES 
A. California Emissions Waiver—History and 
Background in the Context of the Clean Air Act 
Since the early 1940s, California has been forced to deal with 
severe air quality issues as a result of surges in population, an 
explosion of vehicular usage, a niche weather scheme, and unique 
geography. These factors combined dangerously in 1943, when 
visibility was barely three blocks in downtown Los Angeles.77 This 
eventually led to the formation of various air quality committees, 
boards, and scientific initiatives to determine the root cause of the 
California “smog.”78 The cause of the problem was determined 
initially to be Nitrogen oxides (NOx), produced by the rapidly 
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increasing vehicular internal combustion processes.79 However, as 
the science developed, many other types of noxious chemicals were 
identified within the emissions from vehicle tail pipes, and, due to 
the factors described above, California had to respond.  
Therefore, in 1967, prior to the enactment of the federal Clean 
Air Act, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) was established 
to address smog and air pollution at a local level.80 Also in 1967, the 
Federal Air Quality Act was passed.81 This Act included a waiver 
provision that allowed California to enact and enforce emission 
standards for new motor vehicles that are at least as protective, in 
the aggregate, as federal government standards.82 This carve-out 
was only included for California because of their unique situation in 
regards to smog and heavy air pollution, and due to the fact that 
prior to the enactment of the Federal Air Quality Act of 1967, CARB 
had already initiated its own state-level emissions guidelines.83 This 
policy waiver has carried through from the Federal Air Quality Act 
of 1967 to the Clean Air Act, originally codified in 1969, and up until 
the present day version of the Clean Air Act.84  
Furthermore, almost as important as the carve-out for 
California’s emission regulations is Section 177 of the Clean Air Act, 
which gives other states the authority to adopt California’s emissions 
guidelines and restrictions as long as they are more stringent than 
the federal government’s guidelines.85 This is an extremely 
important provision to the Clean Air Act and the nation’s emissions 
as a whole because approximately fourteen states, including 
California, have adopted the more stringent emissions guidelines 
that CARB has set, which, prior to the waiver revocation, also 
includes restricting and dialing back greenhouse gas emissions from 
vehicular tail pipes.86  
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Additionally, throughout all of these years, EPA and the federal 
government have never attempted to revoke California’s emissions 
waiver. A waiver preemption request was only denied once, in 2005, 
when California initially attempted to include greenhouse gas 
emitting chemicals within the fuel pipe emissions under the 
waiver.87 The EPA administrator, under Section 209(b), must not 
issue a waiver if it is found that: “(1) the state’s protectiveness 
determination was arbitrary and capricious, (2) the state’s standards 
are not needed to meet ‘compelling and extraordinary conditions,’ or 
(3) the state’s standards are inconsistent with certain Clean Air Act 
provisions related to technical feasibility and lead time to 
manufacturers.”88 In a decision published to the Federal Register in 
2008, the EPA initially denied California’s waiver; 89 however, upon 
reconsideration, they reversed after opening up an additional public 
comment period90 and re-evaluating the greenhouse gas emissions 
portion of the waiver against the backdrop of Massachusetts v. 
EPA.91 Nevertheless, EPA published a final rule in September 2019 
revoking California’s authority to receive emissions waivers under 
the Clean Air Act for the foreseeable future.92 This is uncharted 
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B. EPA’s Revocation of California’s Clean Air Act 
Emissions Waiver 
On September 19, 2019, EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler 
and the acting Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), James C. Owens, promulgated the “The 
Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One 
National Program (“One National Program Rule”).” The Final Rule 
primarily serves two functions: 1) to revoke California’s emissions 
waiver under Section 209 of the Clean Air Act; and 2) to finalize 
NHTSA’s amended new greenhouse gas emissions standards and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for nationwide 
and nationally-applicable fuel economy standards.93 This effectively 
preempts state programs already in place that previously followed 
California’s more stringent GHG tailpipe emissions standards and 
ZEV mandates.94 In revoking California’s waiver, EPA and NHTSA 
continued the Trump Administration’s trend of strategic regulatory 
roll-backs of Obama administration climate change mitigation and 
environmental administrative programs and initiatives.95  
While not the issue at hand in this particular case study, it is 
interesting to note that this particular revocation of California’s 
waiver is currently in the preliminary stages of a hotly contested 
lawsuit, which will likely be litigated for the foreseeable future.96 
The State of California and approximately twenty-two states and 
four cities brought suit against the EPA, DOT, and NHTSA (and 
their respective Administrator’s/Secretaries) in the U.S. District 
Court of the District of Columbia, seeking judicial review of the Final 
Rule.97 The Final Rule itself explains the basis for the authority of 
the EPA to revoke California’s waiver; essentially, it boils down to 
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the EPA’s interpretation that California does not have the requisite 
“compelling and extraordinary conditions” for the waiver in relation 
to the GHG emissions, due in part to Administrator Wheeler’s 
distinction between the “uniquely-bad” local issues of smog and the 
global and world-wide problem of greenhouse gasses contributing to 
climate change.98 This Final Rule justifies the above distinction by 
finding that, “even if California does have compelling and 
extraordinary conditions in the context of global climate change, 
California does not ‘need’ these standards [under CAA section 
209(b)(1)(B)] because they will not meaningfully address global air 
pollution problems of the sort associated with GHG emissions.”99 
This then brings us back to state-level regulations and what 
power the states still retain after this Final Rule was promulgated. 
In the next couple of sections, this Note analyzes whether, and to 
what extent, states can regulate HFCs within vehicles, taking into 
consideration preemption, dormant commerce clause, and 
extraterritoriality issues. Following these analyses, I will provide a 
framework and examples of federal and state actors who are pushing 
the envelope on regulating HFCs and SLCPs and what the future 
may hold in regard to this highly contentious and relevant issue. 
C. State-Level Regulation of HFCs within Vehicle 
Refrigerants—Preemption Issues 
The idea of preemption can be traced back to our founding 
fathers and Article VI of the United States Constitution, which 
states, “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”100 Over the years, this single line has been 
repeatedly litigated. As such, the case law is applicable to many 
different cases and fact patterns. In the context of state-level 
regulation of HFCs, and analyzing preemption in this context, there 
are three separate types of preemption that must be discussed: 
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express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.101 
Express preemption occurs when Congress (or the regulating 
agency) includes a specific provision within the statute or regulation 
that “expressly” details the bounds of the preemption and how it 
applies to state statutes and regulations.102 Express preemption 
provisions typically employ different types of commonly-used 
language that will tip off the reader that an express preemption 
clause may exist, such as “related to,”103 “covered,”104 “in addition to, 
or different than,”105 and, “requirements, “laws,” “regulations,” and 
“standards.”106  
In addition to express preemption, preemption provisions can be 
read into statutes and regulations, referred to as “implied” examples 
of preemption. The Supreme Court has recognized two different 
types of implied preemption: conflict preemption and field 
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preemption.107 Conflict preemption occurs in situations where a 
federal statute or regulation and a corresponding state-level statute 
or regulation cannot be implemented or effectively followed without 
contradicting or conflicting with each other.108 Field preemption 
exists in situations where “state law occupies a ‘field reserved for 
federal regulation,’ leaving no room for state regulation,”109 such as 
federal immigration law.110 Additionally, in order for preemption to 
apply in the first place, a preemption analysis must first address the 
“presumption against preemption,”111 which requires that, “if 
confronted with two plausible interpretations of a statute, we ‘have 
a duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.’”112 
However, this analysis has been challenged in various Supreme 
Court cases recently, and, as such, the law is not as clear as to when 
this presumption applies, especially in the context of “fields 
traditionally regulated by the federal government.”113 In the context 
of the regulation of greenhouse gasses, and specifically for this 
particular analysis of HFCs, I will focus more on the substantive 
issues relating to the express and implied preemption prongs. Local, 
state, and federal government have all historically regulated 
environmental and energy-related issues, and it is uncertain 
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whether and in what form the aforementioned presumption might 
apply.114 
Since California began regulating its emissions prior to the 
passage of the Clean Air Act, preemption questions began to arise. 
In regulating HFCs under the carve-out emissions’ waiver of the 
Clean Air Act, the express preemption provision states that “[n]o 
State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to 
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new 
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”115 
This is an express preemption and specifically designated as an 
example of a “related to” provision. While this is a pretty clear 
example of the federal agency’s purpose and intent to regulate this 
field and, thus preempt state actors from setting standards for 
vehicle emissions, some may argue that the regulation of air 
conditioning units in vehicles (and thus HFCs in vehicles) would not 
be preempted because it does not directly involve the emissions from 
motor vehicles.  
The abovementioned express preemption provision most clearly 
applies to emissions from the tailpipes of vehicles, and the particular 
GHGs emitted from said tailpipes. Air conditioning chemicals are a 
completely separate entity from the chemicals most associated with 
tailpipes, such as those burned off and emitted through the use of 
petroleum and oil, and thus HFCs would not likely directly involve 
emissions from motor vehicles. However, a counter argument to this 
point is that the regulation of GHGs within air conditioning units in 
vehicles indirectly influence and involve the emissions from tailpipes 
because the fuel efficiency of cars can be directly related to the energy 
load that air conditioners place on the car itself. Therefore, 
regulating and/or changing the type of refrigerant or type of system 
utilized within the vehicles can influence the emissions of chemicals 
from the tailpipe. As such, even though HFCs would not likely be 
included under the “tailpipe emitters” category, the regulation of 
HFCs still will likely be “related to” the control of emissions from 
tailpipes, thus preempting state regulatory agencies from setting 
standards.  
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However, as set out in Part IV(B), California’s emissions 
preemption waiver allows the state to apply to the Administrator of 
the agency enforcing the Act (here, EPA) for waiver of the 
preemption provision as long as the state standards set are “at least 
as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal 
standards,” which is determined by the state itself (here, the state of 
California and CARB).116 Therefore, California is expressly allowed 
to regulate vehicle emissions at a standard more stringent than the 
federal government’s, and other states around the country can then 
adopt California’s standards, fourteen of which are currently doing 
so.117  
However, now that EPA has revoked California’s emissions 
preemption waiver, the question becomes whether all of the 
programs, regulations, initiatives, and state statutes that California 
has implemented (and thirteen other states have adopted and 
implemented) are thus preempted by the new federal emissions 
standards as defined in CAFE and administered by NHTSA.118 This 
analysis strictly focuses on the regulation of HFCs within vehicles 
and, currently, no state has implemented vehicular language into its 
HFC and GHG emissions regulations or statutes based on 
California’s emissions waiver.119 Accordingly, the waiver is not as 
applicable to this analysis. Still, this is a pressing matter, and 
whether EPA has the authority to revoke California’s waiver will 
likely be resolved in litigation. Keeping this in mind, the first 
analysis that follows is conducted under the assumption that a court 
will reverse the waiver revocation, followed by an analysis that the 
waiver will stand. 
First, if the revocation waiver of California’s emissions 
exemption stands, it is likely that any forthcoming HFC state-
standards that attempt to regulate vehicle air conditioners will be 
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preempted by either Section 209 of the Clean Air Act120 or the fuel 
economy standards preemption section of the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA).121 As enumerated above, Section 
209 of the Clean Air Act would likely apply through conflict 
preemption because, even though not emitted through vehicle 
tailpipes when the air conditioners they are utilized in are leaky or 
otherwise failing, HFCs are still indirectly “related to” the emissions 
of GHGs through vehicle tailpipes due to the effect that refrigerants 
and air conditioning systems have on fuel efficiency and thus tailpipe 
emissions.  
As for the fuel economy standards of the EPCA, the particular 
preemption language that applies here is outlined as follows:  
[w]hen an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this 
chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may 
not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy 
standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles 
covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.122  
As discussed above, this is an express preemption and is 
specifically designated as an example of a “relating to” provision. 
However, unlike the Clean Air Act provisions, this deals strictly with 
laws or regulations relating to fuel economy standards rather than 
emissions relating to any chemicals that are emitted from the tail 
pipes of vehicles. In turn, GHGs that could potentially be included 
under this provision are those that are byproducts of the burning of 
fuel specifically such as carbon dioxide.123 However, HFC 
regulations or laws would likely be preempted under this statute as 
they are related to the indirect emissions results that air 
conditioning regulations can have on fuel efficiency and inherent fuel 
emissions. Thus, if the waiver stands, direct standard-setting for 
emissions of HFCs from vehicle air conditioners will likely be 
preempted by the federal government under the provision of the CAA 
and EPCA. However, this is not to say there are no alternatives.124 
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 Second, if the waiver of California’s emissions exemption is 
reversed, it is a much closer question as to whether the state-level 
regulation of vehicular HFCs would be preempted by federal law. 
Prior to California’s waiver being revoked, both California and 
Washington passed legislation regarding the regulation of HFCs in 
refrigerants, and neither addressed HFCs within vehicle air 
conditioners.125 One potential reason for this may be due to the 
requirement of labeling of chemicals within vehicular air 
conditioning systems.126 The source of this labeling requirement is 
the CAA provisions giving effect to the Montreal Protocol, specifically 
Title VI, which was amended and added in 1990, and Sections 611 
and 612.127 Section 611 details the labeling requirements for the 
unacceptable ozone depleting chemicals, stating that products 
containing the said chemicals must contain the following visible 
labeling: “Warning: Manufactured with [insert name of substance], 
a substance which harms public health and environment by 
destroying ozone in the upper atmosphere.”128 Section 612 details 
the Safe Alternatives Policy, and provides the EPA Administrator 
the authority to “publish a list of (A) the substitutes prohibited under 
this subsection for specific uses and (B) the safe alternatives 
identified under this subsection for specific uses.”129 EPA has 
promulgated various regulations in accordance with the authority 
granted under this statute that detail labeling requirements and 
conditions of use for the safe alternatives, including HFCs.130 For 
example, the regulations still currently in effect regarding car 
manufacturers and refrigerant manufacturers labeling of HFCs, 
particularly HFC-134a, detail a specific set of standards and 
specifications for how these particular chemicals must be labeled, 
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including a particular color scheme and set of warnings and 
disclosures.131  
 Therefore, if a state were to regulate HFCs within vehicles, 
which would inherently require labeling similar to Washington’s 
labeling requirements of stationary refrigerant sources,132 a 
manufacturer may have to attempt to comply with two sets of 
labeling requirements and regulations, one state and one federal, 
thereby invoking preemption issues. 
As discussed above, there are different types of preemption to 
consider. In this narrow hypothetical, it is likely that only implied 
conflict preemption would be invoked. There is no explicit federal 
provision that would forestall state regulations from regulating 
HFCs, specifically in the context of labeling of HFCs. Therefore, this 
would not likely bring into question express preemption. 
Furthermore, field preemption would not likely be invoked. Field 
preemption applies when there is a demonstration that Congress left 
no room for states to regulate particular matters.133 Additionally, the 
state law must occupy a “field reserved for federal regulation,”134 
where the “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system 
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject.”135 
In Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., the Third Circuit reversed 
the District Court’s holding that field preemption applied to a dispute 
between labeling requirements under the Food and Drug Act (FDA) 
and state law labeling requirements.136 The Court found that even 
though the FDA has a comprehensive and vast regulatory scheme 
regarding food and drug laws and labeling requirements, “we are 
reluctant to find field preemption predicated solely on the 
comprehensiveness of federal regulations,” and the “mere existence 
of a federal regulatory scheme . . . does not by itself imply preemption 
of state remedies.”137 This is similar to the facts analyzed here. While 
the Clean Air Act is an incredibly comprehensive and vast regulatory 
scheme, its main purpose is to regulate air emissions from stationary 
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and mobile sources,138 which differs from the Food and Drug Act in 
that labeling is a major requirement and purpose of the Food and 
Drug Act.139 Here, labeling is simply an offshoot of particular 
requirements for a very specified, very minute portion of the Clean 
Air Act. In Holk, the Third Circuit still held that field preemption did 
not apply, even though labeling requirements are so pervasive and 
important throughout the Act.140 Therefore, as labeling 
requirements simply do not rise to the same level within the Clean 
Air Act, it follows that field preemption would likely not bar the 
states from regulating and imposing labeling requirements on the 
HFC manufacturers.  
However, conflict preemption will likely bar state regulations. 
Conflict preemption exists where state law “stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress”141 or “where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility.”142 Here, the state regulation 
would likely make complying with the federal regulation a physical 
impossibility. The labeling requirements for HFC-134a are from the 
SNAP regulations, which utilizes HFC-134a as an accepted 
substitute for ozone-depleting chemicals.143 Thus, the labeling 
requirements that the state regulation would impose would 
effectively attempt to remove the HFCs from service and warn the 
consumer that they are present within the car or that the HFCs have 
been removed and are no longer utilized. It would be a physical 
impossibility to include this abovementioned type of labeling with 
federal requirements that expressly allow HFC-134a to be utilized 
and, in fact, pushes it as a substitute for ozone-depleting chemicals. 
As such, looking at the regulation of HFCs in mobile sources (namely 
light duty vehicles), it is likely that state regulation may still be 
preempted by the federal regulations and the Clean Air Act, even if 
the California Clean Air Act waiver revocation is reversed in court.  
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D. State-Level Regulation of HFCs within Vehicle 
Refrigerants—Dormant Commerce Clause Issues 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution states 
that “Congress shall have Power to . . . regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”144 However, as Chief Justice John Marshall explained in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, referring to the power that the framers granted to 
the federal government in certain provisions of the Constitution 
(here, namely the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several states”145), “power can never be exercised by the people 
themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie 
dormant.”146 Effectively, this one line sets the framework for the idea 
that the Commerce Clause, while granting power to the federal 
government to regulate commerce, also effectively restrains the 
states from regulating commerce among states, “even [with] those 
parts of the national economy that Congress has not regulated—
where federal power remains dormant.”147 This particular “negative” 
aspect of the Commerce Clause has been invoked abundantly 
throughout the years and most recently upon the United States 
Supreme Court in 2019, with affirmation of the doctrine in Tennessee 
Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas.148 There, the 
Supreme Court affirmed that the Dormant Commerce Clause is still 
in effect and reiterated that the pertinent test to sustain a law that 
has been determined to discriminate against “out-of-state goods or 
nonresident economic actors” is “a showing that [the law] is narrowly 
tailored to ‘advance a legitimate local purpose.’”149  
A general rule that has arisen from the years of case law is that 
the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state discrimination 
against all “out-of-state economic interests,” and “when a state 
statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate 
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests 
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over out-of-state interests, [the Courts] have generally struck down 
the statute without further inquiry.”150  
Additionally, extraterritoriality may be invoked in conjunction 
with the Dormant Commerce Clause and will be analyzed as well. 
Extraterritoriality is a quasi-prong of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause that is invoked when it can be shown that “commerce [] takes 
place wholly outside of the regulating state’s borders.”151 Here, the 
analysis will surround Washington’s HFC regulation, with the 
hypothetical provision included that details the phase-down of HFCs 
within vehicular air conditioning units. 
 First, the hypothetical provision within Washington’s HFC bill 
would likely look similar, if not identical, to the provisions regarding 
HFCs used in light duty motor vehicle air conditioning units, 
contained within the now-overruled SNAP regulations,152 as the rest 
of the stationary HFC end-uses within Washington’s bill are adopted 
directly from the language of said-regulations.153 As such, whether 
the regulations will invoke Dormant Commerce Clause and/or 
Extraterritoriality challenges will depend on the retrofitting or 
labeling requirements of the refrigerant systems in vehicles as well 
as the incentive programs mentioned within Washington’s bill as-is.  
Generally, in analyzing a state statute or regulation under the 
dormant commerce clause, the Courts have utilized a two-tier 
approach. In the first step, a state statute will be deemed invalid per 
se if it “discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of in-state 
economic interests or if its practical effect is to control conduct 
beyond the boundaries of the regulating state.”154 The second step 
then applies the “Pike Balancing Test”, which details that, when “a 
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statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and 
regulates evenhandedly, [the court has] examined whether the 
State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate 
commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”155 
 In the Supreme Court Case of Tennessee Wine & Spirits 
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, the Court held that a two year residency 
requirement for alcohol facility licensing was in violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause because it “expressly discriminates 
against nonresidents and has at best a highly attenuated 
relationship to public health or safety.”156 However, in Bronco Wine 
Co. v. Jolly, the Court held that labeling requirements for a wine 
company were not discriminatory to other states after it applied the 
Pike balancing test157 and determined that “the state's interests in 
protecting the reputation and integrity of its vital wine industry from 
the use of misleading brand names outweighs the incidental effect 
on interstate and foreign commerce.”158 Similarly, in American 
Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, the Court found that a unique marking 
design indicating that the canned or bottled beverage is qualified for 
recycling in Michigan did not burden interstate commerce because 
the “unique-mark requirement burdens in-state beverage 
manufacturers who meet the designated thresholds to the same 
extent it burdens out-of-state manufacturers who meet the 
designated thresholds.”159 However, the Court then went on to hold 
that the Dormant Commerce Clause was violated based off of the 
extraterritoriality prong since Michigan was “forcing states to 
comply with its legislation in order to conduct business within its 
state, which creates an impermissible extraterritorial effect.”160  
 Here, in analyzing Washington’s legislation regarding HFCs, by 
incorporating a hypothetical vehicle end-use labeling and retrofitting 
requirement, it is likely that the Dormant Commerce Clause will be 
violated on the extraterritoriality prong, similar to Snyder. This is 
likely the case because applying the labeling and retrofitting 
requirement is not discriminatory to other manufacturers outside of 
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Washington when compared to in-state manufacturers. As such, one 
must analyze the second prong and apply the Pike balancing test. In 
doing so, it is likely that the in-state economic interest to regulate 
HFCs and protect the State’s interest of combatting climate change 
outweighs the incidental effect on interstate commerce. However, 
also similar to Snyder, extraterritoriality would likely be invoked 
because mandating auto and refrigerant manufacturers to 
completely change their air conditioning unit retrofitting and 
implement new and potentially obtrusive labeling requirements to 
conform with the phase-down of HFCs would likely equate to 
Washington “forcing states to comply with its legislation in order to 
conduct business within its state.”161 As such, Washington’s 
legislation will likely be in violation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, specifically in terms of extraterritoriality.  
 Furthermore, as an aside, since another piece of the analysis 
deals with whether the state’s economic interests are favored over 
out-of-state interests,162 it is likely that Washington’s legislation, 
which implements a state program that incentivizes the elimination 
of legacy uses of HFCs,163 would favor in-state interests over out-of-
state interests and thus violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
V. CONCLUSION AND ALTERNATIVES TO 
REGULATING THE PHASE-DOWN OF HFCS 
MOVING FORWARD 
As determined above, with the current regulations and 
environment regarding the phase-down of HFCs, state actors will 
likely face various challenges to regulation and legislation of this 
issue due to EPA policies promulgated during the Trump 
administration.164 However, this is not to say that there are not 
alternate routes that may be taken in order to effectuate the 
regulation of these detrimental GHGs.  
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Even though EPA has hindered HFC regulations, in April 2020, 
the D.C. Circuit court struck down the Trump administration’s 
vacatur of the Obama administration’s SNAP regulations. The Court 
found the vacatur unlawful because the proper administrative 
procedures were not followed.165 In revoking the SNAP regulations, 
EPA did not provide the public an opportunity to weigh in on its 
decision, and thus, the D.C. Circuit Court held that “the one option 
EPA could not permissibly pursue was the one it chose: promulgating 
a legislative rule without abiding by notice-and-comment 
requirements and without invoking any exception to those 
obligations.”166 Thus, even though the EPA will likely appeal this 
ruling, there is hope at the federal administrative and judicial level 
to effectively regulate these detrimental chemicals once again.  
Additionally, federal legislation can still prove to be a powerful 
tool in addressing this issue. While local actors are working to 
regulate HFCs at the state-level, the federal legislature has also been 
working to get a bill, identified as the American Innovation and 
Manufacturing Act (AIM Act) of 2019, which originated in the 
Senate, to a vote.167 This particular piece of legislation is built 
around the innovation of new alternative refrigerants to replace 
HFCs and other GHGs utilized currently in refrigerant end-uses.168  
On March 11, 2020, John Barrasso (R-Wyoming), the committee 
chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 
decided that the bill would go to legislative hearing in front of the 
Senate on March 25, 2020 in order to “improve the legislation so it 
works for all American people.”169 This particular bill allegedly has 
bipartisan support in the senate,170 though as of the time of this 
Note, a vote has not been called. Additionally, at the time of this 
Note, due to COVID-19 concerns, the March 25, 2020 legislative 
hearing was replaced with a Public Comment period in which 
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interested parties are able to send concerns and suggestions 
regarding the bill to the Senate Committee, which will then take the 
comments into consideration and post them on the Senate 
Committee website.171 As of April 29, 2020, approximately 118 
representatives of various senate, industry, environmental, and 
state associations and entities have provided written comment and 
testimony regarding the AIM Act, with certain important industry, 
environmental, and state leaders supporting the passing of this 
bipartisan bill.172  
Additionally, as the presidency has changed hands, and the 
Biden administration has entered the White House, multiple 
positive updates have occurred regarding the regulation of HFCs at 
the federal level. Primarily, the abovementioned bipartisan AIM Act 
was included in an omnibus to the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2021, identified as the American Innovation and Manufacturing 
Act of 2021.173 This is incredibly exciting, and forecasts a positive 
step in the right direction for the phase down of HFCs at the federal 
level-though vehicular HFC regulation is still not expressly included 
within this bill.  
Furthermore, on January 27, 2021, President Biden signed an 
Executive Order titled, “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and 
Abroad,” which explicitly directs the Secretary of State to prepare a 
“transmittal package” seeking the Senate’s consent to ratify the 
Kigali Amendment.174 This is another beacon of hope for the 
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resurgence of the United States’ international presence in the 
climate arena. 
Further, even though preemption or dormant commerce clause 
issues may arise, there is nothing stopping state actors from working 
with industry to determine whether feasible alternatives are 
available in phasing down HFCs on a state-by-state basis without 
invoking lawsuits. In certain states, the automotive industry has 
entered into agreements with state regulators in order to continue 
California’s more stringent emissions criteria, even in light of EPA 
revoking the waiver.175  
If industry and state actors are willing to come to agreement on 
certain facets within the regulatory scene, HFCs may have the 
potential to be phased-down, even if there is pushback from the 
federal government. For example, companies have been working on 
implementing different types of air conditioning units within 
vehicles that are more fuel efficient and utilize HFC-152a, a chemical 
that has an exponentially lower GWP than the leading type, HFC-
134a.176 As mentioned above, while it would be ideal for all HFCs to 
be phased-out, if there is a possibility for a dialogue to continue 
between environmentalists, local and state actors, and the 
refrigerant/auto industry, there is a real possibility for change to 
occur and extremely high GWP-potential HFC refrigerants to no 
longer be the norm. 
 In tackling an overwhelmingly important and relevant issue as 
climate change, there are necessarily countless hurdles that must be 
addressed. Currently in the United States, the regulation and phase-
down of exceptionally high GWP chemicals is one such hurdle that 
has required, and will continue to require, significant time, 
resources, and negotiations between government actors, 
environmental groups, and industry. In detailing the United States’ 
role in climate change and GHG emission regulations, this Note has 
analyzed the state’s power in regulating HFCs in refrigerant end-
uses, specifically focusing on mobile air conditioning units. In 
summary, in light of the EPA’s revocation of California’s Clean Air 
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Act tailpipe emissions waiver, it is likely that the states’ power to 
regulate HFCs is preempted, and also likely limited or barred by the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. However, this Note focuses on the 
extremely narrow window of state-level regulation of HFCs and the 
even narrower lens of vehicular end-uses. In the larger climate 
change scheme, there are legitimate routes available in which the 
United States, through action taken as a nation and through zealous 
local and state action, can regain its environmental footing and 
successfully combat climate change through the phase-down of 
HFCs.  
36https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol38/iss2/6
